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It has often been asked whether the truth-function known as material implication correctly accounts 
for  conditionals  in  the  indicative  mood.  After  defining  material  implication  and  indicative 
conditionals (hereafter just “conditionals”), I will discuss why I believe the former does not always 
account for the latter. Defences for a material interpretation of conditionals by H. P. Grice and Frank 
Jackson will then be given.
A function is analogous to a machine which outputs something when something is input. 
The inputs and outputs of truth-functions are truth values: “true” or “false”. The symbol for material 
implication (‘⊃’) is thus formally defined: if the sentence before it (the antecedent) is true and the 
sentence after it (the consequent) is false, then the material implication is false; otherwise it is true.
Conditionals are a complex sentence form; they are made up of sentences and can be either 
true or false (but not both). If A and B are any sentences, then “If A, then B” is the conditional form. 
The previous sentence is also a conditional (A and B can be complex sentences, like “The flag is 
raised and somebody is  dead.”)  As with material  implication,  A  is  the antecedent  and  B is  the 
consequent.
Conditionals  with synthetic  antecedents  and consequents  will  be  considered,  rather  than 
conditionals with analytic antecedents or consequents.  The subject in a synthetic sentence – like 
“the flag” in the sentence “The flag is raised” – does not somehow contain the predicate (here “is 
raised”). Contrast this with the analytic sentence “The white swan is white.” Since this cannot be 
false, we cannot speak of “If the white swan is white, then the white swan is white” having a false 
antecedent or consequent, which is crucial.
Material Implication does not Necessarily Express Conditionals
Does material implication correctly account for, say, “If the flag is raised, then somebody is dead”? 
The question is whether the sentence is false when “The flag is raised” is true and “Somebody is 
dead” is false, but true otherwise.
First of all, a speaker of the sentence is not necessarily saying anything about “The flag is 
raised” being false or anything consequent on its falsity. They are not doing so explicitly in any 
case. The assertion may just be that a dead person is a necessary and sufficient condition for a raised 
flag. The sentence is true if both the antecedent and consequent are true; the sentence is false if the 
antecedent is true and the consequent is false. That is all.
Secondly,  conditionals  can be used within a non-formal language for different purposes. 
They do not always operate under the same truth conditions. There are circumstances in which the 
truth conditions of the sentence “If the flag is raised, then somebody is dead” are more numerous 
than the above: a person may say it within the context of a military base, implying strongly that if 
the flag is not raised then nobody is dead. If this occurs, then the sentence (its suggestion strictly 
speaking) is true. It is, however, difficult to imagine a case where the sentence is true when the 
antecedent is false and the consequent is true.
There is a popular counterexample to the material account of conditionals by William S. 
Cooper. Suppose there is a motor hooked up to two switches (S and T) and that the only information 
we are given is expressed by the sentence “If S and T are presently thrown, then the motor starts.” 
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This sentence is formalized, on the material interpretation, as (S  T) ⊃ M. Throwing both switches 
is a sufficient condition for the motor starting, but it is unknown whether the motor starts if either 
switch is thrown independently. The sentence “'It is the case for one or other of the switches that if 
that switch is thrown (independent of whether the other is) that the motor will start” (formalized on 
the material interpretation as [ (S ⊃ M) v (T ⊃ M) ] ) can be false. 
But in normal classical logic, the latter cannot be false if the former is true:
Defences of the Material Account of Conditionals
The traditional view nevertheless posits conditionals as accounted for by material implication.  One 
argument for this view (A1) relies on the implicational relationship between disjunctions (complex 
propositions of the form “either A or B”) and conditionals: 
Assumptions               Formulae                   Justification  
1 (1) E Assumption
2 (2) D Assumption
1,2 (3) L 1,2
1,2 (4) ¬ R v S 3 NC formalization
1,2 (5) R⊃S 4 Implication
(“D” = “if the flag is raised, then somebody has died”; “E” = “propositions of the form ‘if A, then 
B’ are equivalent to propositions of the form ‘either not A or B’”; “L” = “either the flag is not raised 
or somebody has died”; “R” = “the flag is raised”; “S” = “somebody has died.”)
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Grice and Jackson: The Counterexamples Cannot be Asserted
H. P. Grice accepts the material interpretation of conditionals. He therefore considers statements 
such as the following to be paradoxes: no proposition can imply (as the antecedent of a conditional) 
an arbitrary consequent by being falsified; yet ‘P ⊃ Q’ cannot be false if ‘¬ P’ is true. His response 
to purported counterexamples is to introduce a distinction between two properties of propositions: 
appropriateness for conversation and truth. Neither implies the other.
Whether  or  not  a  proposition  should  be asserted  is  determined by certain  maxims.  The 
maxims of quality and quantity particularly ensure the cooperation of language users. The maxim of 
quality is a requirement for propositions to be true and justified. The maxim of quantity requires the 
contribution of the speaker to be sufficiently informative but not more informative than is necessary 
(Grice is uncertain about the latter point). Suggestions follow from conversation when the maxims 
are assumed.
If the material interpretation of conditionals is correct, then “If S and T are thrown, then the 
motor starts” (P ⊃ Q) 1 is false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Grice 
points  out that  the conditionals  in the purported counterexamples are  consistent with this;  they 
demonstrate rather that the conditionals should not be asserted. If I understand him correctly, he 
assumes that what should not be asserted cannot be formalized; if  P  ⊃  Q cannot be formalized, 
neither can ¬ P|=NC P ⊃ Q.
Why should these conditionals not be asserted? The falsity of the antecedent or the truth of 
the consequent occurs in these scenarios. If the sentence “S and T are not thrown simultaneously” 
(¬ P) conveys as much information as P ⊃ Q, then it meets the maxim of quantity when P ⊃ Q does 
not. P ⊃ Q asserts more than is necessary. The same holds for the sentence “the motor is starting” 
(Q) in place of ⊃ P. 
To  refute  the  counterexamples,  Grice  relies  on  a  suggestion  which  follows  from 
conversational maxims; Jackson  relies on a  conventional suggestion about all propositions of the 
form P ⊃ Q. Conditionals have a specific purpose in Jackson’s account. If a speaker asserts “if A, 
then  B”,  then  she  is  demonstrating  that  she  accepts  the  necessary truth  of  B given  A (modus 
ponens). However, such a demonstration cannot occur in the counterexamples.
Suppose  a  speaker  believes  the  proposition  “S  and  T  are  not  being  thrown”  (¬P),  for 
example.  If she is not informed about  Q – “the motor is  running” – then a statement of  ¬P is 
stronger than an assertion of ¬ P v Q, which conveys more information than is necessary. It would 
nevertheless be appropriate to assert the latter as long as-and this is the crucial point-she believes 
¬P. If P is found to be true, the disjunction would not be stated or would be withdrawn; she would 
not move on to infer Q by a negation of ¬ P in the disjunction and modus tollendo ponens.
Since ¬ P v Q is equivalent to P ⊃ Q, knowledge of P would also make P ⊃ Q not highly 
assertible. The conditional  “If S and T are being thrown, then the motor is starting” could not be 
operated on by modus ponens.
This distinguishes the conditionals in the counterexamples from those which are “robust” 
enough to be believed when their antecedents are true. They are not asserted merely because their 
antecedents  are  believed  to  be  false,  as  in  the  above  example.  Take  the  principle  that  any 
proposition is  either true or false (but not both):  T  v F2.  This is highly assertible,  according to 
Jackson, even when it is learned which disjunct is correct; ¬ T  ⊃ F is highly assertible for any 
proposition and modus ponens can (a priori) operate on “If a proposition is not true, then it is false.”
1 This is a valid formalization, though different from the one above, and serves the present purpose better.
2 Strictly, the formula should be written as (T v F)  ¬ (T  F); but the former conjunct in these cases is often written 
alone as a matter of convention.
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